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I. CONSTITUTIONALISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE
There is no widely accepted definition of constitutionalism and
constitutional culture The student of comparative constitutional law looking
for a more precise meaning of constitutional law observes that the more often
some categories of political or sociological jargon are used, the less frequently
they are defined. This phenomenon occurs because constitutional scholars
often ask what contents are commonly associated with constitutionalism and
constitutional culture rather than look for essential qualities or elements of
these terms.
Upon closer analysis, we find that constitutionalism is most often linked to
rule of law. Such rule of law forms limitations on governmental powers.
These limitations protect fundamental rights In addition, some constitutional
experts emphasize the relationship of constitutionalism to political culture: a
component of "the moral, intellectual and cultural climate in state."4 Quite
often, constitutionalism means nothing other than a good constitution.
Between the principal demands of constitutionalism, we can find almost all
essential precepts of basic democratic law: popular sovereignty and self-
determination, the concept of the constitution as supreme law, ideas of
democracy and rule of law, limited government, separation of powers, checks
and balances, civilian control of military, protection of human rights, and
many others.5
Constitutional experts who believe that the rule of law is the single most
fundamental feature of constitutionalism usually agree that such law may exist
and develop within authoritarian or even dictatorial states. In this political
environment, constitutionalism describes the mechanisms of political stability
without references to self-sustaining democratic institutions.6 Contrarily,
2 See MICHEL ROSENFELD, CONSTITUTIONALISM, IDENTITY AND LEGITIMACY 4 (1994)
("There appears to be no accepted definition of constitutionalism"); see also Louis Henkin, A
New Birth of Constitutionalism: Genetic Influences and Genetic Defects, 14 CARDOZO L. REV.
533, 534 (1993) ("Constitutionalism is no where defined.").
- See Michel Rosenfeld, Modern Constitutionalism as Interplay Between Identity and
Diversity: An Introduction, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 497, 497 (1993).
4 Daniel P. Franklin & Michael J. Baun, Introduction to POLITCAL CULTURE AND
CONSTITUTIONALISM: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 1, 4 (Daniel P. Franklin & Michael J. Baun
eds., 1995).
5 See Henkin, supra note 2, at 535-36; see also Andrew Arato, Dilemmas Arisingfrom the
Power to Create Constitutions in Eastern Europe, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 661,663-64 (referring
to constitutionalism as "a political form" with "a body of fundamental laws."). This approach
links constitutionalism to written constitutions.
' See Franklin & Baun, supra note 4, at 2.
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democratic constitutionalism assumes that the development of constitutional
consciousness requires the imposition of limits on the operation of the
government; hence, the process of thinking about a constitution begins when
the first efficient restraints are imposed on the arbitrary power of rulers.7
The method of searching for contents commonly associated with
constitutional culture is often less successful. It is characteristic that one
cannot find a satisfactory definition of constitutional culture even in works
written directly on the topic.' Constitutional culture was so recently
introduced into constitutional vocabulary that the process of its absorption by
legal scholarship is far from complete. For this reason, any constitutional
scholar trying to explain constitutional culture must begin with a clear
foreground.
In an effort to clarify my foreground, I will begin discussing
constitutionalism by commenting on relationships between constitutionalism
and constitutional culture. Because the main aim of this article is to
characterize East-Central European constitutional culture, I will successively
single out traits most typical of new postsocialist democracies. These traits
will next be compared with observations concerning the tendency of a region
to converge with or diverge from Western constitutional culture.
My proposition rests on the observation that there are two operating
definitions of constitutionalism. The definitions stem from using this term in
its narrow sense as well as in a wider, more historic meaning. In the narrow
sense, constitutionalism is just a concept; i.e., the trend in the theory of state
and law that contends that the political organization of a state and society
should rest on the order that is regulated by the fundamental norms and rules
collected in the act or acts called a constitution. In the wider meaning, the
concept of constitutionalism is rooted in historic framework. Here,
constitutionalism rests on two precepts; under the first, the actual
constitutional order is understood as the form of organization of the state and
society prescribed by the constitutional norms and principles, and under the
" See Roundtable Discussion, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AMERICA,
POLAND, AND FRANCE: A BICENTENNIAL COLLOQUIUM AT THE MILLER CENTER 101, 113
(Kenneth W. Thompson & Rett R. Ludwikowski eds., 1991).
' See, e.g., ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND
CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL REVIEw 23-26 (1989) (Nagel simply associates the essential term
of his essay with political culture and assumes that judicial review is its essential component);
for reviews of Nagel's book, see Christopher L. Eisgruber, Disagreeable People, 43 STAN. L.
REv. 275 (1990); Martin H. Redish, Political Consensus, Constitutional Formulae, and the
Rationale for Judicial Review, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1340 (1990); Lillian R. BeVier, On the
Enduring Dilemma of Judicial Review, 39 EMORY L.J. 1229 (1990).
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second, the system of operating ideas and concepts indicate what should be the
functions and structure of the constitution.
Constitutionalism, in the narrow sense, may precede the emergence of the
constitutional order in the same way that constitutionalism existing in the
European Enlightenment preceded the adoption of the first written
constitutions. Constitutionalism of this period evolved as a way of thinking
about the organization of a state and society that through the use of
constitutional or formal documents would limit the absolutism and
arbitrariness of state organs.9 Furthermore, by analyzing this evolution,
historians can note national constitutional qualities-whether those qualitites
are American, French, German, or other. Understood in this way,
constitutionalism would encompass both operating constitutions with
constitutional orders as well as concepts of a constitutional regime.
We may observe that constitutionalism, in the narrow sense, becomes sine
qua non components. While historic elements are essential to constitution-
alism, common modem elements are not essential. Evidently, constitution-
alism can exist without a written constitution. Similarly, one may observe that
the mere fact of the adoption of a constitution does not predetermine the
existence of the constitutional order: The state may adopt a purely decorative
constitutional act that may contrast with unconstitutional practices.
Furthermore, a state may make constitutional rules and concepts fictions. The
lack of constitutional order would not, however, rule out the existence of
constitutionalism in the same way as it operated for decades in communist
states despite the "declaratory" character of many communist constitutional
provisions.1"
A constitutional culture is a component of a political culture, and as such
has the same essential qualities: attitudes, opinions, values, emotion,
information, and skills. This author does not limit the scope of constitutional
' For example, one may comment on the development of constitutionalism without actual
constitutional order in France during the beginning of the eighteenth century. At the same time,
in Poland, one may note the inefficient constitutional interaction between elected Polish
monarchs and nota bene constitutions. For broader comments, see RErr R. LuDWncowsKI &
WILLIAM F. Fox, JR., THE BEGINNING OF THE CONSTITUTONAL ERA: A BICENTENNiAL
COMPARATiVE ANALYSIS OF THE FIRST MODERN CONsTTrUTIONS 48-74 (1993).
'0 See Rett R. Ludwikowski, "Mixed" Constitutions-Productofan East-Central European
Constitutional Melting Pot, 16 B.U. INT'L L. J. 1, 68 (1998).
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culture to purely psychological elements, but rather incorporates a behavioral
component into constitutionalism." Responding to some concerns,' 2 this
approach does not suggest the obliteration of differences between political
science and political culture. Rather, political science focuses on studying
human behaviors in their complexity as activities oriented on accomplishment
of political goals; political culture examines human actions as reflections of
human attitudes toward politics and political order. To use an example, it is
important for the student of constitutional culture to check whether the
politicians or scholars compromise or assault each other during constitutional
disputes. While political scientists may wonder whether rude political
behaviors are successful in battles for political goals, commentators of cultural
phenomena might investigate to what extent such behaviors are expressions
of dissatisfaction with constitutional processes.
Hence, similar to the overlap in the studies of political science and political
culture, constitutionalism and constitutional culture overlap.
Constitutionalism, in a narrow sense, understood as the set of opinions and
doctrines about constitutional order is, in fact, one of the components of
constitutional culture. Constitutionalism, in a wider sense, grows out of
cultural environment, and vice versa. Examination of these intermingled
phenomena in East-Central European realities warrants two further
introductory observations.
II. SEARCHING FOR A PARADIGM OF EAST-CENTRAL
EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE:
DESCRIPTIVE V. PRESCRIPTIVE APPROACH
1. The first reflection deals with the level of acceptable generalization of
observations on regional constitutional cultures. One who searches for cultural
" In the sixties, Almond and Verba were recognized as main proponents of a
"psychological" concept of political culture. Almond wrote "a political culture is a particular
distribution of political attitudes, values, feelings, information and skills." COMPARATIVE
POLmCS TODAY: A WORLD VIEW 42 (Gabriel A. Almond & G. Bingham Powell, Jr. eds., 2d
ed. 1980). For wider discussion of political culture see GABRIEL A. ALMOND & SIDNEY VERBA,
THE CIVIC CULTURE (1963); see also RETT R. LuDwiKowsKI, POLSKA KULTURA POLITYCZNA.
MITY, TRADYoE I WspOLczEsNosc 3-9(1980). For the expression of "behavioral" concept of
political culture, see W. Pluskiewicz, "Kultura Polityczna-Swiado-mosc Polityczna-Wiedza
Polityczna" in 2 STUDixA NAUK POLrrYCZNYCH (1977); W. KNOBELSDORF, KULTURA
POLITYCZNA I jEj ROLA W SYSTEMIE POLITYCZNYM SPOLECZENSTWA SOSCjALISTYCZNEGO
(1974).
"2 The problem was widely discussed at the XI Congress of Polish Historians in 1974; for
commentary, see LuDwucOwsFi, POLSKA KULTURA POLITYCZNA, supra note 11, at 4.
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characteristics of several countries immediately faces the question of whether
there are common cultural features which would distinguish one group of
political entities from other groups. Finding some similarities is not enough
to justify a thesis concerning the common cultural fabric or core of the group;
the compared designates may demonstrate more differences than common
traits. This reflection brings us to question whether, in fact, there exists a
paradigm of East-Central European constitutional culture.
There exists no single postsocialist constitutional model, and no single
constitution or constitutional system served as a prototype for the
constitutional drafters from the new democracies. 3 The countries of East-
Central Europe share some common recent history, but the roots of their
constitutional experience are very different. Some of them have mature
constitutional traditions and some began their constitutional experiments in
this century. 4 They have intrinsic similarities, which can distinguish them
from Western countries, but, on the other hand, they show so many different
features that placing them within one single classifying category is
problematic, if not virtually impossible."3
Searching for common cultural characteristics of the new democracies is
an even more difficult task. Because constitutions and constitutional orders
are expected to endure, their relative longevity facilitates a comparative
analysis. Constitutional culture, however, is a fluid and flexible subject of
examination. Culture has stable components such as constitutional tradition,
historical models of relevant constitutions, or constitutional mechanisms that
have already been qualified as good or bad. Dynamics of other elements of
culture are often substantial. With the recent development of means of mass
communication, information and skills are acquired quickly; opinions and
emotions change overnight; and even attitudes and behaviors can transform
relatively easily.
These observations do not dictate that comparisons of constitutional
cultures are impossible. These observations, however, do require scholars to
discuss geographical constitutional cultural characteristics with a solid dose
of caution. When comparing cultural phenomena of more than a dozen
countries, one should directly compare tendencies, trends, similarities, and
differences rather than models, patterns, and paradigms.
"3 SeegenerallyRettR. Ludwikowski, Searchingfor a New Constitutional Model for East-
Central Europe, 17 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 91 (1991).
14 See id. at 133-36.
15 See RETT R. LUDwncowsKi, CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN THE COUNTRIES OF FORMER
SOVIET DOMINANCE 233-34 (1996).
[Vol. 29:1
CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE
2. A second reflection regarding constitutional formation addresses the
problem of evaluating political culture. 6 In discussing constitutional
transformations, many questions naturally arise. Are there parallels between
the Western and East-Central European constitutional histories? Does Eastern
Europe have any liberal or democratic traditions upon which to draw? Do
these countries have "progressive" or "backward" political cultures? 7
The very attempt to evaluate constitutional culture raises instinctive
reservations. Public opinion connotes the terms "progressive" or "backward"
in regards to political models as either desirable and good or undesirable and
bad. In fact, it is often difficult to estimate "social progressiveness" in such
spheres as art, philosophy, literature, or politics. Hence, some components of
political culture are subject to evaluation while others can only be described.
For example, one can measure either society's political knowledge or
publically available information, but one can hardly evaluate social emotions
or attitudes. In the same way, political traditions are a function of a variable
that is the sum of its social, economic, and geographical elements. These
elements always have certain relative aspects and can seldom be evaluated as
either clearly "progressive" or clearly "backward."
Admittedly, one can examine liberal or democratic elements of Western or
Eastern traditions; one can even argue that from the perspective of social well-
being, the Western model leads to greater economic prosperity. The West, not
the East, made greater contributions toward democracy and placed more
emphasis on political pluralism and the fragmentation of power. Still, this
does not mean that visible symbols of the West are synonymous with progress.
As Montesquieu remarked almost 250 years ago, the value of human
arrangements is always relative. In terms of general evaluation, Western and
Eastern models are not "backward" or "progressive," "good" or "bad."
Western models are simply different. The main task of comparative
constitutional scholarship is to describe and analyze cultural phenomena-to
answer the question "what is the constitutional culture?"--rather than to define
what that culture should be. Even if one attempts to analyze the consequences
of social attitudes, behaviors, opinions, and emotions, one is still in the area
" See generally LUDWIKOWSKI, supra note 15, at 232-36.
n Seegenerally George Schdpflin, The Political Traditions ofEastern Europe, DAEDALUS,
Winter 1990, at 55, 55 (stating that "The Western political tradition always emphasized
pluralism and the fragmentation of power. In Eastern Europe, which was politically backward,
the state played a much more dominant role as the principal agent of change. This resulted in
a politically preeminent bureaucracy and a weak society.").
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of descriptive examination. Evaluations bring us dangerously close to
prescriptions that may be interpreted as a panacea for all problems."8
III. THE DRAFTERS. "NEW-WAY" APPROACH TO
CONSTITUTION MAKING AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
"What among other factors contributed to Wladimir Maciar's
successes-wrote Slubowski-was repeating that Slovakia is going its own
way, different than Russia and different than the countries of the West."' 9 This
observation reflects the message repeatedly and successfully sent to the public
by the political leaders of many East-Central European democracies. The
"new way" approach resulted from the new post-socialist political elites'
feelings of suspension between socialist legacy and Western tradition.
Since the very moment the region entered into an era of extensive
constitutional transformation, it became clear that the new democracies would
break with their communist past and adopt constitutions that would be marked
as "entirely new." On the other hand, the drafters of the new acts could not
disregard the post-socialist societies' sentiments for their communist past. The
longing for the illusive communist stability, which is common to all new
democracies, is rooted in misinformation or lack of knowledge about life in the
West. For decades, communist propaganda tried to ridicule Western moral
and social values. Such propaganda presented the new generation of people
in socialist countries with pictures of rotten Western societies living in
capitalist- and mafia-ruled urban jungles. Widened exposure to Western
political, legal, and social culture either reinforced the myth of a rotten and
greedy West or contributed to a contrasting, but equally false, image of the
West as a paradise.
People in the post-socialist countries or socialist states, exposed to Western
political, legal, and social culture, have problems comprehending that being
elevated to a higher standard of living does not automatically guarantee
happiness for all. Newly introduced market mechanisms reveal step-by-step
that those at the bottom of the social structure are still frustrated, even if their
conditions of life improve significantly. These individuals might be better off
S See JAN.ERIK LANE, CoNSTITUTIoNS AND POLITICAL THEORY 4 (1996) (stating that
"Modem constitutional theory would encompass both the IS and the OUGHT. It will describe
and analyse the constitutions of the world as well as discuss what a good or just constitution
amounts to."). I believe that writing on constitutional culture should be more cautious with
verdicts as to what constitutional culture ought to be.




than they were in communist times, but their inequality within a different kind
of society creates a longing for the communist "equality in misery." These
factors have resulted in major confusion in socialist and post-socialist
countries about the West, as well as equally confusing beliefs in the West
about an overwhelming yearning of the socialist societies for Western values.20
The social attitudes described above contributed to an ambivalent approach
to constitutional drafting in East-Central Europe. The drafters of the new
constitutions did not have any doubts that they would borrow from the West.
But, the drafters wanted to borrow in their own way. On the one hand, they
faced so-called "American and Western European universalistic
constitutionalism" 2' with its appeal for the reception of well-tested liberal
values.' On the other hand, they listened to the Western scholars' suggestions
that remedies for their problems could be found "in local traditions rather than
in the history of the United States during the era of the Enlightenment. z As
a result, the drafters were intent on rejecting the well-tested Western
constitutional models and producing their own constitutions.24
In one of my studies on constitution-drafting in East-Central Europe, I tried
to compare this "new approach" to constitutional "gardening" as contrasted
with constitutional "engineering" or surgical "transplanting."'25 An engineer's
or surgeon's work requires some level of exactitude. Freedom to experiment
is limited. In contrast, constitutional gardeners neither construct their products
from well-tested components nor transplant organs into accomplished social
organisms. Rather, they pick seedlings from different gardens and implant
them, piece by piece, into living and constantly changing vegetation composed
of rules, norms and institutions. The new gardens do not resemble traditional
2 For more comments on post-communist nostalgia for communism, see LUDWIKOWSKI,
supra note 15, at 190-92.
" S.N. Katz, "Constitutionalism in East Central Europe: Some Negative Lessons from the
American Experience," excerpts from manuscript dated December 12, 1993, in VICKI C.
JACKSON & MARK V. TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITTmoNAL LAW 286 (1999).
' B. Ackerman has written, "This said, I want to resist the fashionable relativism that looks
upon liberalism as a local prejudice of Anglo-American civilization or maybe even a few
English-speaking universities inhabited by rootless cosmopolitans." Id. at 277.
Katz, supra note 21.
24 Their attitudes are in many ways reminiscent of the reactions of the post-colonial African
leaders, who repeatedly claimed that their constitutions should have local flavor because people
do not serve the constitutions; rather constitutions are adopted to serve the people. See H.W.O.
Okoth-Ogendo, Constitutions Without Constitutionalism: Reflections on an African Political
Paradox, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY: TRANSITIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY
WORLD 65, 67-68 (Douglas Greenberg et al. eds., 1993).
' See generally Ludwikowski, supra note 10, at 64.
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French or British parks; they have a mixed character, blending together
features produced by different tastes, cultures and styles.
"Blending and mixing" became a style-a significant feature-of
constitutional culture of East-Central European countries. The style stemmed
from public attitudes and emotions and from aggressive Western lecturing
about the universal values of liberal constitutionalism. This style gave the new
constitutions eclectic character that justifies commentators' concern over
consistency.
Consistency is one of the basic features of a good constitution. Consistency
implies that constitutional provisions gel in such a manner that their rationale
is fully explainable and that they mesh with other components of the
constitutional system. To be consistent, the drafters of the constitutions would
have had to acquire a deep comparative knowledge of the countries from
whose constitutions they borrowed. Many drafters, however, did not acquire
this knowledge, which resulted in a striking amount of incoherence. For
example, the guarantees in the Albanian Constitution for "diversity of
ownership [and] free initiative of all economic subjects"26 neighbor
declarations that the economy be regulated by the state and coincide with
typical socialist statements that "economic initiative of juridical and physical
persons cannot develop contrary to the social interest and should not impair the
security, freedom and dignity of man."27 Surprisingly, the concept of checks
and balances is married to the idea of separate functions of the organs of
power. In the Kazakh Constitution, the principle of supremacy of parliament
is artificially combined with a presidential system of governance.2 A
bicameral legislature is established in the Romanian Constitution without any
clear rationale, and a preventive (French) model of judicial review was
adopted without any respect to the fact that the particular country lacks a well-
developed system of administrative courts.29 These kinds of inconsistences
were avoided by countries such as Bulgaria, Poland and Russia. The
constitutional drafters of these countries were able to restrain their tendency
to blend different constitutional principles and instead borrowed, to some
extent, from recognized constitutional models.
26 ALB. CONST., art. 10 (interim 1991).
27 Id.
2 See KAz. CONST., art 64.
2 See comments on the Romanian Constitution in LUDWmOWSKI, supra note 15, at 128.
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IV. THE CITIZENRY: CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITIONS,
INFORMATION, EMOTIONS
Tradition is one of the most stable components of political culture;
Cultural memories are not deleted or replaced overnight. From this
perspective, the student of East-Central European constitutional culture must
admit that the citizenries of the new democracies are entering an era of post-
constitutional transformation with memories lacking constitutional
experiments and burdened by socialist legacies.
Poland is the only country in East-Central Europe with constitutional
traditions comparable to the West. In 1791, when it adopted the first written
constitution in Europe," Poland had significant experience with checks and
limitations of the royal power.' In fact, with an eighteenth century
"democracy of the gentry" system, it was Poland, rather than any Western
European country, that became the early symbol of a liberal and constitutional
monarchy. The pluralization and fragmentation of power in Poland, however,
weakened the state and contributed to the state's loss of independence in 1795
and subsequent partition by Russia, Prussia, and Austria. Until World War I,
Poles, along with Hungarians, Czechs, Slovaks, Lithuanians, Latvians,
Estonians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians, were incorporated into the absolute
empires of Europe. Other countries within the region, such as Bulgaria and
Romania, joined the family of sovereign states in the last decades of the
30 See generally RETT R. LUDWiKOWSKi, CONTINUITY AND CHANGE INPOLAND 1-43 (1991).
, Wiktor Osiatynski, who wrote widely on Poland's constitutional traditions, notes a
differing opinion. He claims that the history of the constitutional movement in Poland should
be understood as the process of granting privileges by the ruler to the people (the nobles) not as
a contract or bargain between people to provide for limited government. See Wiktor Osiatynski,
Perspectives on the Current Constitutional Situation in Poland, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
DEMOCRACY: TRANSITIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 312,313 (Douglas Greenberg et al.
eds., 1993). For this reason, Osiatynski argues, democracy was better rooted in the
constitutional traditions of Poland rather than in the concept of limited government. See id. at
319-20.
This author is of a different opinion. Polish history does not recognize the concept of"a
political contract" concluded amongst the people themselves. These types of contracts were
based on a philosophical abstraction rather than historical facts. Polish history includes,
however, a concept of contracts formally signed by the Polish monarch with the people. So-
called "pakta konwenta," negotiated by the electoral monarchs and the nobles since the first
election in 1573, were formal contracts confirming the rights and privileges of the nobility and
obligations of the king and accepted limitations imposed on his power. See VICKI C. JACKSON
& MARK V. TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 296-98 (1999). For comments on
the history of Polish "pakta konwenta" see Z. KACZMARCZYK & B. LEsNODORsKi, 2 HISTORIA
PANSTAWA I PRAWA POLsKi 116-17 (1966).
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nineteenth century, and the independence of Albania was recognized at the
Great Powers' 1912 conference in London.32  Thus, while Western
democracies began to flourish, the restraints imposed on the activities of
representative bodies in East-Central Europe successfully hampered the
development of constitutionalism until the turn of the nineteenth century, and
in many cases, until the end of World War I. The successive constitutional
experience of the countries of this region was again disrupted by the interwar
authoritarian transformations of the East-Central European states.33
The communist legacy had additional enduring impact on the constitutional
culture of the region. One of the fundamental premises of constitutionalism
is to promote the reconciliation of individual rights and social interests.
Constitutional culture cannot flourish in an atmosphere of cynicism and
distrust in common social values. The "decorative" constitutional acts, framed
in the Moscow-imposed fashion, commanded no social respect. Socialism
undermined and compromised any belief in collective values. The attempt to
create a "collective mentality" turned out to be a total failure. Socialism,
associated with the Bolshevization of society, resulted in cultural and moral
impoverishment and the leveling of all groups to the lowest common
denominator. The real aim of the collective was not to bring the people
together, but to serve as an instrument for the destruction of the individual
approach to life and to promote the complete atomization of society.
The concept of the collective was ridiculed after the fall of communism left
its stigma on the mentality of post-socialist generations. This loss of faith in
the collective has survived as a loss of confidence in the constitution. The idea
of "solidarity," which worked against the common communist enemy, did not
serve as a sort of social cement in the subsequent circumstances that promoted
competition, struggle for survival, and revenge. The citizenries of the new
democracies learned to speak freely and openly; however, they could hardly
digest the lesson that freedom of speech requires dialogue and ability to listen
to others' arguments. The socialist parliaments were quickly transformed from
assemblies composed of compliant "Yes-men" into a fora of deputies,
struggling and assaulting political opponents;4 defamation and slander became
32 For more comments on the constitutional history of East-Central European countries, see
LUDWiKOWsia, supra note 15, at 9-31.
3 The trend followed similar responses of the Western European governments to the crisis
of the 1930s.
34 In fact, it has to be admitted that political brawls are not entirely unknown to West
European politics. Such brawls are exemplified by the 1998 case of Jean-Marie le Pen, barred
in France from holding elective office for political assaults. See Charles Trueheart, French
Rightist is Barred from Officefor a Year, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 1998, at A32. For examples
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widely used instruments of political battles. The Fall 1999 parliamentary
conflicts in Moscow preceded violent street clashes between parliamentary
supporters and military units, and finally resulted in Yeltsin both dissolving
the Russian Supreme Soviet and arresting Chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov.
Yeltsin's actions became vivid symbols of new postsocialist political culture.
Characteristically, high levels of public emotion, occasionally sparked by
constitutional dispute, often go hand in hand with everyday public political
passivity." These apparently contrary feelings of emotion and passivity are
typical combinations within societies of many of the new democracies.
Frequent observations regarding constitutions, hastily adopted in periods of
social and political transformation, demonstrate tumultuous passive and
emotional relationships. However, these relationships often serve as symbols
of legitimization of the new political regimes and are hardly elements of
everyday life that could animate politically passive societies. 6 Passivity and
lack of recognition of the sanctity of a constitution may result in divergence
between the constitution and public opinion as well as lack of public
identification with the constitution or a high level of disapproval for its
provisions. The best litmus-paper test of the level of sufficient
"democratization" of the constitution can often be measured by the number of
constitutional court decisions that have been contrary to public opinion.
Examples of controversial constitutional court decisions include the Hungarian
Constitutional Court's decision establishing the unconstitutionality of the
death penalty and the anti-abortion decision of the Polish Constitutional
Tribunal.37
Active involvement of the citizenry in constitutional dialogue requires an
organized forum for public disputes. The United States provides an example
of public constitutional dialogue. During the 1998-99 impeachment case of
President Bill Clinton, congressional debate, in spite of moral sensitivity of the
issues discussed, offered the public an enormous load of constitutional
information. Media reports, disputes, and everyday explorations of public
regarding the former Hungarian minister of foreign affairs, see Hungary Update, E. EUR. CONST.
REV., Spring/Summer 1997, at 16, 19.
" See generally Stephen Holmes& Cass R. Sunstein, ThePoliticsofConstitutionalRevision
in Eastern Europe, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 275 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995).
36 See Okoth-Ogendo, supra note 24, at 68.
" See generally 1,z6 S61yom, The Hungarian Constitutional Court and Social Change,
19 YALE J. INT'L L. 222 (1994). The proposal of a nationwide referendum in Poland divided
the public and the Sejm in which (on June 17, 1997) 165 deputies voted in favor, 170 against,
with 26 abstentions. See Poland Update, E. EuR. CONST. REV., Spring/Summer 1997, at 25, 28.
20001
GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
reactions contributed to the public's common feeling of participation in the
process of constitutional interpretation. s As is characteristic of a strong
democracy, the sharp public disagreement with the House of Representative's
impeachment conclusions neither produced strong criticism of the constitution
itself, nor underminded the consciousness that it is the people, not enlightened
leaders, that make the constitution. Although the level of generalization of
this reflection may vary from one East-Central European country to another,
one may observe that citizens of the new democracies lack strong
identification with their constitution; this trend, combined with weak
constitutional information and the tendency of the leaders to manipulate public
emotions, may undermine the stability of the regional constitution-making
process.
V. LEGISLATURES: POLITIZATION AND
PARLIAMENTIZATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONS
The first constitutions adopted by the new East-Central European
democracies were relatively rigid; their drafters seemed to believe that their
products would stand unchanged for a relatively long time.40 Apparently, the
drafters were surprised to find that rigidity, meaningless in socialist
constitutions, made the new basic laws hardly amendable.4 '
"' In the same way, it is quite interesting to observe how much information about the
constitutional process in the United States has been passed to the public during the Senate
hearings of two candidates for the posts of associate justices of the Supreme Court: Robert H.
Bork and Clarence Thomas. In contrast, the names ofjudges of the constitutional courts in all
new democracies (including even most active tribunals) are relatively unknown. This fact can
be explained to some extent by a per curiam character of the courts' judgments and lack of
dissenting or concurring opinions; still, the public recognition of the courts' role in the
constitution-making process is much less impressive than in the West in general, particularly in
the United States. The process of the creation of so-called "televising" or "internet" parliaments
is progressing slowly in the new democracies; its effectiveness is still far from being advanced.
39 "Many Romanians still believe that citizens are servants while government officials are
masters." Monica Macovei, Legal Culture in Romania, E. EuR. CONST. REV., Winter 1988, at
79, 80. See also Wiktor Osiaynski, The Constitution-Making Process in Poland, 13 LAW &
POL'Y 125, 125-27 (1991) (commenting on the impact of the tradition of "leaders'-made"
constitutions on the current process of constitution-making in Poland).
40 See L. Garlicki, Normy Konstytuicyne Relatywnie Niezmienne (Constitutional Norms
Relatively Unchangeable), in CHARAKTERI STRuKTURANORM KONsTYTucI (CHARACTER AND
STRUCTURE OF THE CONSTrmIONAL NORMS) 137-55 (1997).
4' The fact that the socialist constitutions, regardless of the level of rigidity, were amended
at will by the communist-controlled legislatures, solidified the illusion that the built-in
constitutional rigidity was of little significance.
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For example, the first post-socialist constitution in the region, adopted by
Bulgaria on July 12, 1991, reserves the right to initiate amendments to either
one-quarter of the national representatives or to the president.42 The National
Assembly may pass a law on amending and supplementing the constitution by
a majority of three-quarters of the national representatives after three rounds
of balloting on different days.43 If the motion does not get the required
majority but is supported by no less than two-thirds of the votes, it may be
resubmitted after two months and subsequently passed by a vote of a two-
thirds majority."
In Romania, the revision of the constitution can be initiated in two ways.
First, the president, acting in cooperation with at least one-fourth of the
deputies or senators, may initiate revision; or by a motion of at least 500,000
citizens coming from at least half of the counties of the country (including
Bucharest) in which the motion received the support of at least 20,000
people.45 The draft of the amendment must be approved by at least a two-
thirds majority of all deputies and senators or, in the case of disagreement
between the chambers, by a joint meeting in which the motion must get
approval of at least three-fourth of the votes.' The final draft of the
amendment must be approved by a nationwide referendum.47 Some
constitutional provisions are not subject to revision. Examples include
governmental form; the national, independent, unitary, and indivisible
character of the state; territorial integrity; independence; the justice system;
political pluralism; and official."
In Estonia, the Constitution may be amended by a law either adopted by a
referendum or parliament (Riigikogu). The initiative to propose revision is
reserved for the president or one-fifth of the deputies.49 The draft must be
debated during three readings with a two-month long interval between the first
42 See BULG. CONST. art. 154.
4' See BULG. CONST. art. 155(a).
44 See BuLG. CONST. art. 155(b). The regular amendments are adopted by the National
Assembly. The adoption of the new constitution and some amendments, such as amendments
relating to changes in territory or form of state, changes in state administration, and changes in
rules of amendments themselves, are reserved for the Grand National Assembly, which is
composed of 400 national representatives. See id. at art. 155-158 (text in LuDwIKowsKI, supra
note 15, at 370).
's See ROM. CONST. art. 146(1).
46 See ROM. CONST. art. 147(1).
47 See ROM. CONST. art. 147(3).
48 See ROM. CONST. art. 148(1). In the Czech Constitution the provisions on democratic
character of the state and the rule of law are not amendable.
49 See EST. CONST. art. 161.
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and second reading and one month between the second and third reading.5
The amendment must get approval of at least a majority at the first session and
three-fifths majority at the deputies at the second session." The parliament,
in matters of urgency, may adopt the draft submitted by a four-fifths majority;
the vote requires the approval of three-fourth of the deputies. 2 The draft may
also be submitted and approved by a referendum if the appropriate motion
supported by at least three-fifths of the deputies and the referendum was held
not later than three months since the vote in parliament. 3
The progress of the constitution-making process in East-Central Europe
demonstrates several phenomena. First, following the first constitutional
explosion of 1991-92,"' the drafters of the constitutions opted for the
distinction of flexibility of constitutional provisions rather than unamendable
fundamental constitutional rules. For example, all of the provisions in the
Constitution of the Russian Federation of December 12, 1993, are amendable.
However, the Russian Constitution recognizes that some amendments
(chapters 3-8) can be adopted by the parliament (three-fourth of the Federation
Council and two-thirds of the State Duma) and approved by no less than two-
thirds of the federal components of the Russian Federation," while some
provisions (Chapters 1, 2 and 9) can be revised only by a Constitutional
Assembly and subsequent popular vote.56 The Constitution of Poland of April
2, 1997, provides for an optional procedure of amending Chapters I, II, and XII
by referendum. The Polish Constitution states that Polish subjects authorized
to initiate amendments (the president and at least one-fifth of the deputies and
the Senate) may require, within 45 days of the adoption of the bill by the
Senate, the bill's submission to a referendum which must be held within 60
days. Other amendments may be adopted by the Sejm with a majority of at
least two-thirds of votes of at least half of the statutory number of Deputies
and by the absolute majority of at least half of the Senators."S
so See EST. CONST. art. 163(2).
st See EST. CONST. art. 164.
s2 See EST. CONST. art. 166.
" See EST. CONST. art. 164.
14 Besides Bulgaria, Romania and Estonia, in this period several other countries adopted
constitutions including Slovakia (September 3, 1992), Poland (interim "Little" Constitution of
October 17, 1992), Lithuania (October 25,1992), and the Czech Republic (December 16,1992).
s See RUSS. CONST. art. 136.
56 See RUSS. CONST. art. 135.
17 See POL. CONST. art. 235(6).
s' See POL. CONST. art. 235(4).
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Second, the drafters of the new constitutions became more sensitive to the
numerous Western constitutional experts' warnings that each transitory period
requires a special degree of flexibility. The drafters realized that pluralization
of the political spectrum in the new East-Central European democracies,
combined with the built-in rigidity of the new constitutions, may freeze the
natural process of constitutional development and, despite the intentions of the
drafters, endanger rather than strengthen the new constitutions' stability.
The growing concern that "preferred generations" 9 of constitutional makers
are leaving fossilized, but defective, constitutions contributes to the suggestions
that "parliamentization" and "politicization" of the constitution should be
viewed as a positive, rather than a detrimental, characteristic of constitutional
culture during transitory periods. Parliamentization usually means two things.
First, constitutional rigidity should be compensated for by leaving parliaments
the exclusive power to amend constitutions. Second, the constitutions should
have artificially inserted indeterminancy; namely, that details of constitutional
norms or principles should be left to regulations of statutory law. Politicization
is understood as mixing constitutional politics with ordinary politics. The
consequences of both processes warrant careful examination.
In fact, the suggestion that full authority to amend the constitution should
be vested entirely in the parliament' has not been seriously considered by the
drafters of new basic laws. In Bulgaria and Russia, some constitutional
amendments require the action of the special Constituent Assembly. In
Estonia, Russia, and Lithuania, the amendments require approval by referen-
dum. In Poland, a referendum is optional. On the other hand, the rigidity of
the basic laws is implanted not by the requirements by the cooperation of the
citizenry or special conventions in the constitution-making process, but by the
provisions requiring qualified majorities to vote in parliamentary action. The
pluralization of the legislative bodies, combined with the demands of two-
thirds or three-fourths majorities, blocks even the early stages of constitutional
revision."
"' Andr's Saj6, Preferred Generations: A Paradox of Restoration Constitutions, 14
CARDozo L. REv. 847, 850 (1993). Saj6 wrote that "the present generation inevitably imposes
its scheme or vision upon future generations, and the constitution-making generation (or the
political forces that be) have a particularly strong impact on future generations." Id. at 850.
60 See Holmes & Sunstein, supra note 35, at 287 ("Constitution making in Eastern Europe
must be a long, drawn out political act.").
6 Trying to compare the amendment process in the Soviet Union and Russia one will find
out immediately that, between 1937 and 1974, the Stalin Constitution was amended 250 times,
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The thesis that built-in flexibility is an important prerequisite of a
constitution's longevity has been an argument often used to defend the
ambiguous language of many constitutions.62 Transparency is an important
feature of a good constitution, but reasonable commentators may differ as to
the meaning of constitutional provisions; commentators should not, however,
conclude that a constitution's clauses are indeterminate. The drafters of the
law should be able to distinguish between flexibility and uncertainty. The
former justifies the very existence of constitutional courts, while the latter
encourages these courts to arbitrarily take over the power to legislate.
The artificial indeterminancy of the East-Central European constitutions
has resulted in several phenomena. First, vagueness creates a tendency to
incorporate awkward statements. Such statements appear to signify the
importance of some social problem but, in fact, provide no command or any
real substance, such as "citizens of the Republic are obliged to pay taxes and
fees in accordance with legislation"' or "the religion... may be taught in
schools." This indeterminancy results in details of the constitutional norms
or principles being left to regulations of statutory law. Thus, constitutions are
"parliamentarized" by the regular legislative processes.65
This approach, used repeatedly by most East-Central European
constitutional drafters in the new democracies, makes sense so long as: one,
constitutional norms declare principles, rules, or directives explaining a social
value or a pattern of socially desirable behavior; and two, norms leave both
detailed procedural regulations and value explanation to the implementing
affecting 73 of the original 146 articles. The attempt to amend the Russian Constitution in
December 1997 was immediately blocked by President Boris Yeltsin who declared that "as long
as I am President, I will not allow any changes to the Constitution." Russia Update, E. EUR.
CONST. REV., Winter 1998, at 30, 30. Using another example, the parliamentary attempts to
amend the Latvian Constitution to extend the term of the parliament and the tenure of the
presidential office have failed six times, as the required majority of two-thirds (66 out of 100
votes) could not be achieved. Finally on December 4, 1988, the Saeima (Parliament) adopted
several amendments at a special plenary meeting with 67 votes in favor and I vote against. See
Latvia Update, E. EUR. CONST. REv., Winter 1998, at 19, 19; KENNETH R. REDDEN, MODERN
LEGAL SYSTEMS CYCLOPEDIA 8 (1985). For details on amendments, see S. RusiNOvA & V.
RiANZHIN, SOVETSKOE KoNSTnTISIONNOE PRAVO 81-85 (1975).
62 As far as the Constitution of the United States is concerned, see William F. Fox, Jr.,
Amending the Constitution to Accomplish Social Goals, SOCIAL THOUGHT, Summer 1983, at 3,
3.
63 KYRG. CONST. art. 25 (text available in LUDwIOWSI, supra note 15, at 469).
POL. CONST. art. 53 (4). The full provision reads: "The religion of a church or other
legally recognized religious organization may be taught in schools, but other peoples' freedom
of religion and conscience shall not be infringed."
65 See Ludwikowski, supra note 10, at 66-67.
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laws. For example, the declaration that citizens should pay taxes is
commonplace, but the constitutional regulation of the principles of
apportionment of expenditures and revenues between administrative or federal
components of the state would meet the above-mentioned standard even if the
detailed regulations were left to regular parliamentary legislation." The point
here is that references to implementing laws should not be used to delay the
formulation of basic constitutional principles.
The proper level of generality in constitution-making is always disputable,
and some new constitutions and constitutional drafts are frequently criticized
for being either too detailed, such as the Ukrainian draft of June 10, 1992, or
too concise and lapidary, such as the Russian Constitution of 1993.67
Commentators on the Polish Constitution of 1997 often claim that the
constitution endlessly refers citizens to statutory laws. Many commentators
fail to recognize that the number of references matters little; rather, the
rationale for "parliamentarization" of the constitution is the important factor. s
The references to "the other laws" should guarantee that citizens' rights can
only be abridged by the statutory laws and that the scope of the governmental
authority can be expended only by the law.69 While statutory laws implement
the constitution, they cannot pronounce basic constitutional principles.
"Parliamentization" of the constitution, understood from above, makes the
concept of the constitution meaningless and produces a body of law that is
vague, indeterminate, and overcomplicated.
Some constitutional commentators have gone even further to state that for
"constitutional politics [to] collapse into ordinary politics... is not only
inevitable but, under current circumstances in Eastern Europe, desirable."7
See generally GERL CONST. art. 104(a) (giving an example of apportionment of
expenditures under the German Basic Law).
67 In fact, most new constitutions are of moderate length (150-170 articles). See
LuDwIKowsK, supra note 15, at 194.
68 Objections as to the number of references to the statutory laws in the Polish Constitution
are not confirmed by comparative analyses. The German Basic Law, comprised of 146 articles,
is slightly shorter than the Polish constitution (243 articles), but refers its readers to "further
regulations of the law" in 47 instances, amounting to thirty-one percent of constitutional articles.
The Polish text does so eighty-seven times, equating to thirty-five percent of its articles. The
relatively short Constitution of Kazakhstan (131) refers to laws only twenty-five times,
amounting to nineteen percent of the articles. The number of references does not make the
Polish Constitution less crisp or clear than the Constitution of Kazakhstan.
"This requirement stems from the fundamental principle of the rule of law that the citizens
can do whatever the law does not prohibit. Governmental authorities should operate on the basis
of the law and within the boundaries of the law.
70 Holmes & Sunstein, supra note 35, at 295. "Mhe very creation of a constitutional culture
in post-Communist societes depends upon a willingness to mix constitutional politics and
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This type ofpoliticization is already visible in East-Central European instances
where constitutional culture has resulted in numerous manipulations of
constitutional mechanisms for purely temporary political goals.
Consider, as a first admittedly untypical example, the Russian
Federation. Ruslan Khasbulatov, before he was deposed by
Boris Yeltsin from his position as Speaker of the Russian
Supreme Soviet, had several constitutional lawyers on his
staff whose job was to tell him when his legislative proposals
conflicted with the constitution. When Khasbulatov learned
of a possible conflict, he did not abandon his legislative
proposal, of course, but with breathtaking nonchalance
initiated the procedure whereby the constitution itself could
be changed. Put succinctly, constitutional amendments have
been used in contemporary Russia (by Yeltsin as well as by
Khasbulatov) as just another technique for outmaneuvering
one's political enemies of the moment."
The power-sharing deal offered to the Russian parliament by Prime Minister
Primakov in January 1999 may serve as another clear example of
constitutional "politicization." Yeltsin's suggested promise not to dissolve the
parliament and dismiss the Primakov government if parliament would suspend
current impeachment proceedings against Yeltsin is, at first glance,
unconstitutional. The political deal would abridge the constitutionally
guaranteed prerogatives of both the president and parliament.
Such examples are not unique. In Kyrgyzstan, the consideration of
bicameral legislatures was motivated by reference to the concept of checks and
balances. Ultimately, however, the upper chamber was perceived as a political
puppet and as an artificially created presidential ally, and drafters of the May
5, 1993 Constitution finally decided to establish a single legislative
chamber-the Jogorku Kenesh.' The situation in Belarus took a different
turn. The Constitution, adopted by the referendum of November 7, 1996,
established a bicameral legislature.73 The drafters reserved for the president
ordinary politics." Id. at 285.
", Id. at 281. Holmes and Sunstein come to the conclusion that this phenomenon is not only
visible in, but probably inevitable and desirable for East-Central European politics.
7 The draft Constitution of June 16, 1992 provided for one chamber, but the outline of the
new Constitution drafted by Turar Koichuyev mentioned two chambers: the Chamber of
Representatives and the Senate.
' See Belarus: Lukashenko-Opposition Conflicts Heats Up, CuRRENT DIG. POST-SOVIET
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a prerogative to appoint one-third of the senators, a clear revelation of the
president's intention to create a "puppet" chamber controlled by him. 4 These
examples provide evidence that politicization of the constitution is both a vivid
characteristic of East-Central European political culture and a component that
goes against the very grain of constitutionalism. Excessive rigidity of the
basic laws cannot be remedied by the degradation of the constitution itself.
The balance between rigidity and flexibility is a conditio sine qua non of a
strong constitution and cannot be substituted by half-measures.7" The trend
toward politicization of the constitution works against the social absorption of
the concept of the rule of law and, hence, must be viewed as such.
VI. THE COURTS: JUDICIALIZATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
V. POLITICIZATION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
One of the greatest novelties of postsocialist constitutionalism, judicial
review, stands in par to such concepts as the division of powers, political
pluralism, and the doctrine of etat de droit (a law-based state). After the fall
of communism, constitutional tribunals mushroomed in East-Central Europe
and became an active component of developing constitutionalism in the
region. Judicial decisions began shaping constitutional culture of the new
democracies equally with legislative actions, implementing decisions of
administration and opinions of the media. Hence, legal scholarship must
answer the following questions: (1) What is the level of appropriate court
activity in reviewing the constitutionality of the laws and interpretation of the
constitution? (2) To what extent are the constitutional courts ready to
challenge political bodies or become themselves involved in politics? (3)
What is the role of the courts in "optimization" of the constitution? (4) What
means will enable courts to be fully functional and effective?
The discussions of the "counter-majoritarian problem" are an intrinsic
component of the Western political culture. Constitutional scholars endlessly
agonize over the limits of intervention of non-elected judges into the
constitution-making processes. Should the judges restrain themselves and
follow "an easy presumption that legislation is constitutional unless the
contrary is clearly shown,"'76 or should they insert their own preferences into
PREss, Sept. 4, 1996, at 15.
74 For a critique of the Belarusian bicameralism, see Analysis of the Draft Constitution of
the Republic of Belarus with Alterations and Amendments, CENTI. & E. EUR. L. INITIATIVE 16-
17 (ABA/CEELI Washington, D.C., October 15, 1996).
7 But see Holmes & Sunstein, supra note 35, at 295.
76 Richard Epstein, Foreword to STEPHEN MECEDO, THE NEwRIGHT V. THE CONSTITUTION,
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the constitution? Is judicial activism a way of making the constitution a
"living document, flexible enough to be used in modem conditions"" or just
a limited coup d'etat?8
The discussion ofjudicial activism, which is an omnipresent component of
constitutional culture in North America, has taken a different turn in East-
Central Europe.79 The so-called American decentralized model was rooted in
the concept of constitutional supremacy and constitutional checks and
balances.80 This system implies that one power is balancing, controlling, and
supplementing the functions of the other, although no single power can
completely subrogate the other. The system vests the regular courts with the
power" to nullify the decisions of the democratically elected organs, without
making the judges equally accountable to the people. As Daniel John Maedor
writes, "The tension between judicial independence and accountability cannot
be altogether resolved,"82 and the American doctrine gives the clear preference
to independence. The American system secures all federal judges the right to
hold office during good behavior and makes them removable only through
impeachment by Congress.
The development of the European doctrine of judicial review took a
different swing. In contrast to the American doctrine, the prevailing European
model of judicial review concentrates the reviewing authority in a supreme
xi, xi (1986).
77 ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND CONSEQUENCES
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 7-8 (1989); for more discussion ofjudicial activism and judicial restraint,
see generally Symposium: Judicial Review Versus Democracy, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1981);
Symposium: Constitutional Adjudication and Democratic Political Theory, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv.
259 (1981); RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:
THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962); John Hart Ely, Foreword: On
Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARv. L. REv. 5 (1978); WILLIAM A. KAPLIN, THE
CONCEPTS AND METHODS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 49-72 (1992).
78 See Robert H. Bork, NeutralPrinciples andSomeFirstAmendmentProblems, 47 IND. L.J.
1,6(1971).
7' "This problem, the counter-majoritarian difficulty ofjudicial review, has received much
more attention from North American scholars in the last decade than from scholars elsewhere
in the world." Carlos Santiago Nino, A Philosophical Reconstruction of Judicial Review, 14
CARDOZO L. REv. 799, 800 (1993) (emphasis in original).
80 See LUDWiKOwSKI, supra note 15, at 9 (setting up the distinction between the judicial
function and the legislative function).
8' See MAURO CAPPELLETfI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 58 (1971);
see also ALLAN RANDOLPH BREWER-CARIAS, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN COMPARATIVE LAW 125-82
(1989).
82 DANIEL JOHN MEADOR, AMERICAN COURTS 60 (199 1).
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court or in a special court.83 Blended, as is the case of the German mixed
model," with some elements of concrete and decentralized review, the
European model gives individuals direct access to the court, but reserves the
right of requesting review of an abstract issue of constitutionality for the
highest governmental bodies or parliamentary groups." The existence ofjust
one constitutional tribunal and limited cooperation of regular courts in the
process of review, combined with relatively short tenures of justices,
strengthens accountability and restrains the tendency to challenge
democratically elected legislative organs.
Although significant discrepancies can be found in the organization of the
constitutional courts in the new East-Central European democracies, the
countries of the region generally follow West European patterns in opting for
centralized review, limited tenure of the constitutional tribunals' justices and
significant contribution of legislative bodies in the process of selection of
justices.
Most of the new democracies provide that both the legislative and
executive organs should cooperate in selecting thejustices, yet the competence
of these organs vary. In some countries, the appointing functions are reserved
almost exclusively for legislatures, as in the case of Hungary, but in other
countries, assignment is relatively proportionally distributed among several
organs. 6 Most of the justices of the constitutional tribunals in East-Central
83 See BREWER-CARIAs, supra note 81, at 183,222; see also Rett R. Ludwikowski, Glowne
kierunki sadownictwa konstytucyinego we wspolczesnym swiecie. Stdiumporownawcze, STUDIA
PRAWNO-EKONOMICZNE, t. XLVIII, at 47-62 (1993).
" For closer comparisons of characteristics of German and French models ofjudicial review,
see LUDWIKOWSKI & Fox, supra note 9, at 49-50.
' For example, the German system permits the Federal Constitutional Court to hear the
constitutional complaints of individuals whose rights have been violated by public authorities
[art. 93 (1) 4a of the Law] but reserves the right to request the review of an abstract issue to the
federal government, a Land government and one-third of the Bundestag members. Compare
GERL CONST art. 93 (1) with GEL CONST. art. 93(2).
" In Poland, justices are individually selected by the Sejm, and the President and Vice-
President of the Tribunal are appointed by the president from a pool of candidates proposed by
all justices of the Tribunal. See POL. CONST. art. 194. In Bulgaria, one-third of the justices are
elected by Parliament, one-third are appointed by a president and one-third are appointed by the
joint meeting of the justices of the Supreme Court of Appeals and the Supreme Administrative
Court. See BULG. CONST. art 147; the Constitutional Court itself elects its President. Romania
follows the French model and splits the power to appoint justices between the president and the
two chambers of Parliament, each having the right to choose one-third of the Court's members.
See ROM. CONST., art. 140. In Russia, the president nominates candidates who are appointed
by the Federation Council. See Russ. CONST. art. 128. In Belarus, the Constitution reserves for
the president the power to appoint half of the justices; the other half is appointed by the Council
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Europe are elected for the periods precisely determined by the constitutions.
For example, in Bulgaria, Romania, Lithuania, and Hungary justices are
elected for nine years, 7 in Albania for two years, in Belarus for eleven years,
in the Czech Republic and Ukraine for ten years, and in Slovakia for seven
years; in Poland, the tenure of justices was eight years, and was extended by
the 1997 Constitution to nine years."
Although the scope of the reviewing activity of the constitutional courts
varies, it notable that the awareness of the "counter-majoritarian dilemma"
affected the drafters' decision to limit the extent of finality of the
constitutional courts' rulings. In some countries (e.g. Poland in 1985-1997 and
Romania), only the rulings on the legality of substatutory laws are binding, but
the decisions on the constitutionality of statutes can be overruled by a qualified
majority of two-thirds of the legislative chamber.89 In Slovakia, the
Constitutional Court has ruled that the challenged acts are "voidable," which
means that the organ which issued the act should bring it "into harmony with
other laws" within six months after the act ceases to be effective. In Lithuania,
the Parliament reserves for itself the final decision in actions on compatibility
of international agreements with the constitution, in the violation of election
laws and in impeachment proceedings."
The concept of constitutional review in East-Central Europe, which differs
from the North American concept, decided that discussion on judicial activity
and judicial restraint focused less on the courts' right to challenge the legality
of actions of the democratically elected organs and more on the question of
whether inexperienced judges will be able to distinguish legal intervention
from the inclination to interfere in everyday politics. The problem of
"correctly channeled activity" has received more attention of legal scholarship
in this region than the issue of "judicial restraint"; "politicization of judicial
of the Republic. See BELR. CONST art. 116. In Lithuania, the justices are chosen by Parliament
from a pool of candidates, one-third of whom are nominated by the president, one-third by the
Speaker of the Parliament, and one-third by the President of the Supreme Court. See LrrH.
CoNsT. art. 103.
87 The Hungarian Constitutional Court recently suggested amending the Constitution and
extending this term to 12 years. See Hungary Update, E. EURL CONsT. REV., Winter 1998, at 16,
16.
88 See ANNAM. LuDwiKowsKA, SADOWNICTWOKONSTYTUCYJNEW EuRoPiE SRoDKowo-
WSCHODNIEJ W OKRESIE PRzEKszTALCEN DEMOKRATYCZNYCH-STUDIUM POROWNAWCZE 52
(1997).
89 See Statute on Constitutional Tribunal, art. 7/3 (Pol.) (1985); ROM. CONST. art. 145.
'0 See LITH. CONST. art 107. In other countries (i.e., Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland under the 1997 Constitution, Russia) the decisions of the constitutional courts on the
constitutionality of the law are final.
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review," rather than the "judicialization of the constitution," became the most
vigorously discussed problem.
In fact, the scope of activity of the new constitutional courts surprised even
the most far-sighted commentators. The constitutional courts in several
countries have been quickly recognized as formidable enemies both by the
executive organs and the legislatures.9 The political conflicts between these
courts and the presidents in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia (before Yeltsin's
decision to dissolve parliament in 1993) have been well documented.92 In
Bulgaria (the Socialist Party) and in Slovakia (the Movement for a Democratic
Slovakia), political parties charged the constitutional courts for confusing
judicial functions with political functions.93 In Romania in 1995, the practice
of sending almost all bills to the constitutional court for review became a
matter of constitutional routine.9' In Albania, the attempts of the constitutional
court to assert more power and actively intervene in the legislative policy of
the People's Assembly involved the Association of Judges in an open conflict
with President Berisha, which resulted in the removal of progressive Court of
Cassation Chairman Zef Brozi."
To what extent did this initially chaotic activity of the East-Central
European constitutional courts evolve into a mature process of "optimization"
of the constitution? Two results are apparent. One, the courts' transformation
of this function, as subjective fundamental rights change into "objective
principles," serves individuals by protecting their freedoms against the state
and other individuals' intervention. Two, such maxims regulate social
91 See LUDwiKowSKA, supra note 88, at 177-82.
' See, e.g., Alexander Lukashuk et al., Survey of Presidential Powers in Eastern Europe,
E. EUR. CONST. REV., Fall 1993/Winter 1994, at 58; see also Kazach Parliament Overrules
Constitutional Court (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Mar. 13, 1995).
" In fact, the constitutional challenges of almost all legislative acts in Bulgaria in 1995
became almost a routine. In Spring 1995, more than a dozen statutes were submitted for the
Parliament's review. See Bulgaria Update, E. EuR. CONST. REV., Summer 1995, at 5, 6;
Bulgaria Update, E. EUR. CONST. REV., Fall 1995, at 5, 8; see LUDWIKoWsKA, supra note 88.
In Slovakia, it became a routine that the President's vetoes ofnumerous statutes were overturned
by the parliament, resulting in sending the questioned acts to the Constitutional Court. See
Slovakia Update, E. EUR. CONST. REv., Spring/Summer 1996, at 23, 23.
"4 See Romania Update, E. EUR. CONST. REV., Spring/Summer 1996, at 19, 19-20.
9s See Rett R. Ludwikowski, Albania, in WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PARLIAMENTS AND
LEGISLATURES 4, 8 (George Thomas Kurian ed., 1998). "Brozi's removal was apparently the
result of his increasingly public positions in favor of judicial independence and against
government corruption; it was accompanied by numerous legal and procedural irregularities and
resulted in protests from numerous international observers." The Judiciary in Albania, ABA
CENTRAL EAST EUROPEAN LAW INInATIvE 12 (1996).
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relationships and impose positive obligations on the state's organs.9' Given
the significant discrepancies in the scope of reviewing activity of the courts of
this region, the results are not universal. Some observations are, possible,
however.
Most of the constitutional courts still focus on review of constitutional
coherence of the laws and conformity of international agreements to the
constitution.97 Within this limited scope ofjurisdiction, some of the courts are
capable of explaining important constitutional principles. The attempts of the
Polish Constitutional Tribunal to analyze the concept of the "rechtsstat clause"
(state ruled by law), and particularly principles of "nonretroactivity of laws,"
"equality," and "vested rights" were widely commended.98 In a similar
fashion, the Hungarian Constitutional Court explained the principle of "fair
trial" and imposed on the Parliament on obligation to amend legislation on
misdemeanors.9 However, the process of extending the constitutional courts'
jurisdiction over the right to hear individual complaints, which gives the courts
opportunity for "optimization" of fundamental rights, is still slow. Hearing
individual constitutional complaints is recognized as the most democratic
feature of judicial review, but its introduction overburdened numerous
European constitutional courts, comprising over ninety percent of their
agendas."°
" The involvement of the courts in the process of optimization of the Constitution has been
widely commented as an important feature of German constitutional culture. "The consequences
of interpreting and treating fundamental rights as rights or as principles become clear when one
views the development of decision making by the Bundesverfassungsgericht." Bernhard
Schlink, German Constitutional Culture in Transition, 14 CARDOZo L. REV. 711,717 (1993).
As an example, in 1973 the German Federal Constitutional Court recognized that academic
freedom is not only a subjective right of German scholars but an objective principle which
imposes on the government on obligation to leave the organization of the university completely
to the academic institutions and free from legislative intervention. See Judgment of May 29,
1973, 35 BVerfGE 79; id. at 719.
" See Ludwikowski, supra note 10, at 52-58 (including more comments on the scope of the
constitutional courts' activity).
" See Mark F. Brzezinski & Leszek Garlicki, Judicial Review in Post-Communist Poland:
The Emergence of a Rechtsstaat?, 31 STAN. J INT'L L. 13, 35-45 (1995); Irena Grudzinska-
Gross, Interview with Professor Andrzej Zoll, Chief Justice of the Polish Constitutional
Tribunal, E. EuR. CONST. REV., Winter 1997, at 77, 77-78.
"See Hungary Update, E. EUR. CONST. REV., Winter 1998, at 16, 17-18.
'oThe number of complaints submitted to the Hungarian Constitutional Court forced this
Court to impose some controls on its own agenda. The Court began checking whether all formal
requirements (deadlines, exhaustion of other remedies, direct violation of individual rights the
petitioner, binding character of the challenged decision, etc.) were met by the applicants and
finally decided that one individual's constitutional claims cannot be subject to the Court's
review. See Andras Mink, Interview with LdzI6 S61yom, President of the Hungarian
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Thus, the progress in the process of optimization of the constitution by the
constitutional courts is steady in some countries but is neither well-understood
nor developed in others. Many of the courts are still highly politicized and the
effectiveness of and respect for the constitutional courts in East-Central
Europe varies from country to country. The courts' full impact on
constitutional culture has still not been felt.
VII. CONCLUSIONS. WEST AND EAST: CONVERGENCE OR
DIVERGENCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE?
This article identifies some characteristics of constitutional culture in the
new East-Central European democracies. It remains to be seen how far these
Eastern European countries will go in their acceptance of a constitutional
culture of the West. Will the Western deference for constitutions and the rule
of law permeate this post-socialist region?
The response to this question requires more in-depth study. There is
definitely the need for reports from all countries of this region on several
issues which were mentioned in this work: on the reaction of legal scholarship
to judicial decision making; the capability of the legal scholars to anticipate
the constitutional courts decisions;1°  the level of acceptance of the
Constitutional Court, E. Eu1. CONST. REV., Winter 1997, at 71, 72. Other countries, which
incorporated the review of constitutional complaints into their judicial practice, followed suit
and began to carefully verify the meritorious character of all submissions. At the time of this
writing, in addition to Hungary, constitutional complaints are permitted by the Constitutions of
the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland (after 1997). The Constitution of Russia, following
the socialist pattern of promising something without enforcement mechanisms, indicates that the
decisions of state organs may be appealed in a court of law. The Russian constitution also
provides that the Constitutional Court may hear claims about violations of constitutional rights
and freedoms of citizens, but it does not explain who can file these complaints and does not list
the right to hear individual complaints among competencies of the Court. See Russ. CONsT.
art. 46. The right to appeal the decision of administrative organs which infringe on citizens'
rights is mentioned in Art. 40 of the Kazakhstan Constitution and Art. 82, § 8 of the Kyrgyzstan
Constitution. The Romanian Constitution provides that any one person suffer damage as a result
of the violation of his rights by a public authority, is entitled to have the injury recognized, the
act revoked, and to receive compensation for the damage (Art. 48). The Constitution, however,
does not explain which court will hear these complaints and provides that the conditions and
limitations for the exercise of this right will be determined by statutory law. For more detailed
analysis of this problem, see LUDWIKOWSKA, supra note 88, at 109.
'0' One example is the German Federal Constitutional Court, which develops fundamental
tenets of Germany's constitutional doctrine and scholarship elaborates on them. See Schlink,
supra note 96, at 730. One may risk the thesis that the involvement of legal scholars in the
process of shaping constitutional culture in East-Central Europe is more substantial; national in-
depth studies are required to confirm this assumption.
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constitutional courts' rulings; and the inclination of the media to pressure the
courts into addressing constitutional issues. 2 The well-balanced evaluation
of cultural convergence of the East and West requires the evaluation of the
level of cultural uniformity of the new democracies; this objective can be
reached only on the basis of national reports.
There are still significant discrepancies in the constitutional cultures of
East-Central European countries. The postsocialist societies have different
constitutional traditions, unequal experiences with democratic mechanisms,
poorly qualified constitutional drafters, and limited staffs of the constitutional
courts. In addition, one must admit that ethnic problems of the new
democracies impose different burdens on constitutional scholarship and
constitution-making. As it has been often observed, one of the rationales of
constitutionalism is to absorb ethnic problems into "demotic" problems of
entire societies. 3 This process is just beginning in East-Central Europe.
A reasonable search must recognize also common cultural features of the
new democracies. These traits seem to stem more from the transitory situation
of the region than constituting an unsurmountable obstacle in the process of
convergence of political culture of the West and East. It can be reasonably
observed that the drafters of the new constitutions share doubts as to the
universal applicability of Western constitutionalism. Their innovative
approach is, however, mitigated by the critical reaction of constitutional
scholarship to the inconsistencies of experimental constitutional "gardening."
It appears that regional constitutionalism will attempt to incorporate local
flavor and local traditions into the Western constitutional framework rather
than reject "imported constitutions."
Political passivity, combined with occasional fireworks of public emotions,
is still a viable feature of regional constitutional culture. The creation of new
channels of political information and platforms for public dialogue may
contribute to the growing respect for collective values and eventually to social
trust in the sanctity of constitutional instruments.
The lack of appropriate flexibility of the new constitutions has resulted in
a tendency toward excessive parliamentarization of new basic laws. This trend
will be curbed by both the growth of the body of laws implementing
" Due to translation problems national reports are a prerequisite to any well-balanced study
of these aspects of constitutional culture.
" "The constituent power of the people will always encompass the ethnic and the demotic
elements of the people. But it is the very rationale of the constitution to transform the
unfathomable power of the ethnos into responsible authority of the demos." Ulrich K. Preuss,
Constitutional Powermakingfor the New Polity: Some Deliberations on the Relations Between
Constituent Power and the Constitution, 14 CARiozo L. REv. 639,660 (1993).
[Vol. 29:1
2000] CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE 29
constitutional provisions and constitutional court decisions explaining
ambiguous language of the constitutions.
Politicization of the constitution along with intrinsic politicization of
judicial review is a more troublesome trend which easily may become a trait
of regional constitutional culture. If not subject to solid and critical
examination, this tendency may divert the development of constitutionalism
in the new East-Central European democracies from the rule of law and
significantly delay the process of convergence of constitutional culture in
Europe.

